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Abstract. Biometric template protection is one of most essential parts in putting 
a biometric-based authentication system into practice. There have been many 
researches proposing different solutions to secure biometric templates of users. 
They can be categorized into two approaches: feature transformation and bio-
metric cryptosystem. However, no one single template protection approach can 
satisfy all the requirements of a secure biometric-based authentication system. 
In this work, we will propose a novel hybrid biometric template protection 
which takes benefits of both approaches while preventing their limitations. The 
experiments demonstrate that the performance of the system can be maintained 
with the support of a new random orthonormal project technique, which reduces 
the computational complexity while preserving the accuracy. Meanwhile, the 
security of biometric templates is guaranteed by employing fuzzy commitment 
protocol. 
Keywords: Biometric Template Protection, Fuzzy Commitment, Orthonormal 
Matric, Discriminability. 
1 Introduction 
Biometric based authentication systems have been applied more and more in our daily 
life. Nowadays, we can access to our personal devices by providing to sensors our 
fingerprint, face, voice, iris,… We also do the same thing in order to access to thou-
sands of online services. There is no need to remember or carry anything like pass-
word, token,… to prove ourselves to systems. It is obviously so convenience. Howev-
er, benefits always come along with challenges. These challenges are related to the 
security of biometrics. As we all know, human has a limited number of biometric 
traits; therefore, we cannot change our biometrics frequently like password once we 
suspect that the templates are revealed [1]. Moreover, the fact that people may register 
thousands of online services makes them use the same biometrics to sign in some 
services. That leads to the cross-matching attacks when attackers follow user’s bio-
metric template cross the online services in order to track their activities. Another 
concern relates to the natural set-backs of biometrics. The fact that biometrics reflects 
a specific individual means it contains sensitive information (e.g. medical conditions) 
which users do not want attacker or even the server storing users’ authentication data 
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to discover. Last but not least, the network security needs to be discussed when user’s 
private information is transmitted over insecure network [2]. As a result, biometric 
template protection is apparently indispensable part in every biometric system appli-
cations. To solve the security issues, the commonly approach is to store the trans-
formed biometric template instead of the original one. According to [1], there are 
three requirements that a biometric template protection technique should possess. 
1. Cancelability (Revocability + Diversity): it should be straightforward to revoke a 
compromised template and reissue a new one based on the same biometric data. In 
addition, the scheme should not generate the same transformed templates of an in-
dividual for different applications. 
2. Security: An original biometric template must be computationally hard to recover 
from the secure template. This property guarantees that an adversary does not have 
the ability to create a physical spoof of the biometric trait from a stolen template.  
3. Performance: the biometric template protection scheme should not degrade the 
recognition performance of the biometric system. This requirement can refer to the 
discriminability of the original biometric template which should be preserved after 
transformed. It also means transformed templates from the same user should have 
high similarity in the transformed space. And the ones from different users should 
be dissimilar after transformed. 
To meet as many requirements as possible, many techniques have been proposed 
which can be classified into two main approaches: the feature transform approach and 
the biometric cryptosystem approach.  
In the first approach, biometric templates are transformed using a function defined 
by a user-specific factor such as a key, a password, or a random string… The goal of 
this approach is to provide diversity and unlinkability by using different transforming 
functions for different applications involving the same set of users. The intrinsic 
strength of biometric characteristics should not be reduced applying transforms (rep-
resented by FAR – False Accept Rate) while on the other hand transforms should be 
tolerant to intra-class variation (represented by FRR – False Reject Rate). According 
to [3], two main categories of this approach are distinguished: 
1. Salting: This transformation is invertible to large extent, therefore, the factor (also 
called an authentication key) has to be kept in secret. Thanks to the key, the can-
celability requirement is guaranteed, and it also results in low false accept rate. 
However, the main drawback is also lied on this key. If the key is compromised, 
the original biometric template can be revealed. Some examples of salting ap-
proach have been proposed in previous works [4-6]. 
2. Non-invertible transform: This approach applies a noninvertible transformation 
function to protect the original biometric template. Noninvertible transformation 
refers to a one-way function which is “easy to compute” but “hard to invert”. The 
key to generate this function can be public. Even if an adversary knows the key and 
the transformed template, it is computationally hard to recover the original bio-
metric template. For this point, this approach provides better security than the salt-
ing. The cancelability is also easily achieved by changing the key which generates 
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the transformation function. However, the main drawback is the tradeoff between 
discriminability and non-invertibility of the transformation function. It is difficult 
to design a transformation function which satisfies both the discriminability and 
non-invertibility properties as the same time. In addition, each function is usually 
suitable for each kind of biometric feature. In [7, 8], the authors presented some 
proposals for generating cancellable fingerprint templates. In [9], the robust hash 
function was designed to transform face templates… 
The biometric cryptosystems were originally developed for securing a cryptographic 
key using biometric data or directly generating a cryptographic key from biometric 
data. However, it has also been used in biometric template protection. In this ap-
proach, some helper data which is public is stored in the database. While the helper 
data does not reveal any significant information about the original biometric template, 
it is needed during matching to extract a cryptographic key from the query biometric 
data. According to [3], two main categories of this approach are distinguished: key-
binding and key generation 
1. Key-binding: In this approach, the original biometric template is bound with a key 
within a cryptographic framework. The result of this combination is stored in the 
database as helper data. This helper data does not reveal much information about 
key or the biometric template. However, the huge setback of this approach is the 
lack of the cancelability property because it is clearly not designed for this. In addi-
tion, the matching process depends on the error correction scheme applied. This 
can possibly lead to a reduction in the matching accuracy. So many techniques be-
longing to this approach have been proposed, e.g. fuzzy commitment scheme in 
[10], fuzzy vault scheme in [11] and its enhanced version for fingerprint, face and 
iris in [12-14], shielding functions in [15],… 
2. Key generation: In this approach, the authentication key is directly generated from 
biometric template. Therefore, there is no need to be concerned about the key secu-
rity. However, it usually suffer from low discriminability which can be assessed in 
term of key stability and key entropy. Key stability refers to the extent to which the 
key generated from the biometric data is repeatable, and key entropy relates to the 
number of possible keys that can be generated. For example, if a scheme generates 
the same key regardless of the input template, it has high key stability but zero key 
entropy leading to high false accept rate. Otherwise, if a scheme generates different 
keys for different templates of the same user, the scheme has high entropy but no 
stability leading to high false reject rate. Therefore, the limitation of this approach 
is it is difficult to generate key with high stability and entropy. Moreover, the key 
generation seems to lose the cancelability property. Some techniques belonging to 
this approach have been proposed in [16-20] for fingerprint, face,… 
From this view, it can be seen that no one single template protection approach can 
simultaneously satisfy three both requirements (cancelability, security, and perfor-
mance). On this account, some recent studies tend to integrate the advantages of both 
approaches while avoiding their limitations. Hybrid approach is the combination two 
or more methods to create a single template protection scheme. Very recently, in 
4 
 
2018, the combination of secure sketch and ANN (Artificial Neural Network) was 
proposed [21]. The ANN with high noisy tolerance capacity can not only enhance the 
recognition by learning the distinct features, but also assure the revocable and non-
invertible properties for the transformed template. In addition, the secure sketch’s 
construction can reduce the false rejection rate significantly due to its error correction 
ability. The fuzzy vault was combined with periodic function based transformation in 
[22], or with the non-invertible transformation to conduct a secure online authentica-
tion in [23]. The homomorphic cryptosystem was employed in fuzzy commitment 
scheme to achieve the blind authentication in [24]. Another combination approach 
was introduced in [25]. In this work, we are going to integrate the random orthonor-
mal project and ideal of fuzzy commitment to guarantee the security for user’s bio-
metric template. 
2 Background 
2.1 Random Orthonormal Projection 
Random Orthonormal Projection (ROP) is a technique that utilizes an orthonormal 
matrix to project a set of points into other space while preserving the distances be-
tween points. It was firstly presented as a secure transform for biometric templates in 
[4], and its remarkable feature is the ability to meet the revocability requirement. 
When considered as a standalone biometric template protection, it can be classified 
into a salting approach by the categorization of Jain [3]. As discussed in Section I, the 
salting approach has low security because the secure template can be inverted if the 
key is revealed. Therefore, in [26] the authors proposed an additional module for 
ROP, which is considered as quantization module (Discriminability Preserving), to 
make it noninvertible. In this work, we try another way to ensure the secure template 
stored in database cannot be inverted. 
The main idea of random projection is to create 𝑘 orthonormal vectors size of 𝑙 (𝑙 
is also the size of the feature vector extracted from an original biometric template and 
usually 𝑙 = 𝑘). To generate these 𝑘 orthonormal vectors, 𝑘 pseudo random vectors are 
created first and then an orthonormalization process like Gram-Schmidt process is 
employed to transform these random vectors into the orthonormal ones. This process 
succeeds if and only if the input vectors are linearly independent. However, this con-
dition cannot always be guaranteed when a set of random vectors are generated. In 
summary, generating an orthonormal matrix of size 𝑘×𝑘 from Gram-Schmidt process 
may be a critical problem when applied on constraint computationally devices like 
PDA and handheld devices 
Another method to effectively deliver orthonormal matrix was  introduced in [27]. 
The main idea of this new method is based on the fact that a small size orthonormal 
matrix can be generated without applying Gram-Schmidt process. This matrix is pre-
sented as below: 
𝐼𝜃 = [
cos 𝜃 sin 𝜃
− sin 𝜃 cos 𝜃
] (∀𝜃 ∈ [0, 2𝜋]) 
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In the same way, we can create an orthonormal matrix A of size 2𝑛×2𝑛  owns a 
diagonal which is a set of n orthonormal matrices of size 2×2. The other entries of A 
are zeros. We present the example of matrix A of size 2𝑛×2𝑛  as shown in the formu-
la below where the values {𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑛} are the random numbers in the range 
[0: 2𝜋] 
𝐴 = [
𝐼𝜃1 0
0 𝐼𝜃2
⋯ 0
⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮
0 0
⋱ ⋮
⋯ 𝐼θ𝑛
] 
 
         𝐴  =
[
 
 
 
 
 
cos 𝜃1 sin 𝜃1
−sin 𝜃1 cos 𝜃1
…      …            0
…      …            0
⋮ ⋮
⋮ ⋮
0
0
0
0
  ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
   ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
 …
 …
cos 𝜃𝑛
−sin 𝜃𝑛
sin 𝜃𝑛
cos 𝜃𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 (∀𝜃i  ∈ [0, 2𝜋]) 
  
In result, given the biometric feature vector x of size 2n, orthonormal random ma-
trix A of size 2𝑛×2𝑛, random vector b of size 2n, we have the transformation  
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝑏 
Whenever, users have a thought that their secure biometric templates are compro-
mised, these transformed templates can be replaced by the new ones which can be 
easily constructed by choosing a new set of values {𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑛} and vector b. 
By using this technique to produce the orthonormal matrix, there is no need for a 
complex process such as Gram-Schmidt. Beside its effectiveness in computational 
complexity, it can also improve the security while guaranteeing intra-class variation. 
2.2 Fuzzy Commitment 
Fuzzy commitment scheme belongs to the key-binding approach in biometric cryp-
tosystem [10]. It is the combination between Error Correcting Codes (ECC) and cryp-
tography. To understand how fuzzy commitment scheme works, we have to learn 
about ECC. Formally speaking, ECC plays a central role in the fuzzy commitment 
scheme. ECC checks and corrects the corrupted messages if they contains a certain 
number of errors which this ECC can afford to check.  
In fuzzy commitment scheme, a biometric data is treated as a corrupted codeword. 
During enrollment phase, a user registers biometric template BT, randomly chooses a 
key K (considered as a codeword). Helper Data Extraction module computes the help-
er data HD of biometric template BT and key K. During authentication phase, a bio-
metric query B (B and BT can be quite different because of noise) and the helper data 
HD are put into the Recover module to extract the key K’. If the difference between B 
and BT is smaller than the error correction capability of the ECC employed in this 
fuzzy commitment scheme, the Recover module can recover exactly the same key. 
The extracted key K’ , then, is checked with the enrollment key K to decide whether 
the biometric query is valid or not. This process is demonstrated in Fig.1. 
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Fig. 1. Fuzzy commitment scheme. 
3 Proposal scheme 
The main idea of this hybrid scheme is to secure a non-invertible cryptographic key 
from cancelable templates. The proposal assumes that the extracted feature of a bio-
metric template can be presented by a vector in continuous domain. Fig. 2 depicts the 
main idea of the proposal scheme. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The main idea of proposal scheme. 
3.1 Enrollment Phase 
In the enrollment phase, the user creates a random number 𝐾𝑀 which is used to gener-
ate a random orthonormal matrix M (as described in section 2.1). This 𝐾𝑀 is stored on 
the user’ s device to regenerate the matrix M for authentication phase. If user wants to 
change the transformed template, he/she just has to create new value of number 𝐾𝑀. 
The feature extraction module extracts a feature vector B from the input biometric 
data. Then, B is combined with matrix M to produce the cancelable version 𝐵𝑇𝐶 . The 
user also creates a random key K. The fuzzy commitment scheme is applied with the 
inputs (cancelable biometric 𝐵𝑇𝐶  and the random key K). The output of this process is 
the helper data HD which is stored in the database after that. User also stores the hash 
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version of K into the database for the authentication phase. The enrollment phase is 
demonstrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Enrollment phase. 
3.2 Authentication Phase 
In this phase, user provides his/her query biometric data to feature extractor module. 
It results in the feature vector B (note that with the same user, B and BT cannot be the 
same because of noise). Meanwhile, user retrieves the 𝐾𝑀 in his/her device, and put it 
into the orthonormal matrix generator module to regenerate the matrix M. Then, B 
and M are put into the random orthonormal projection module to create another ver-
sion of B, which is 𝐵𝐶 . Since the orthonormal projection provides the discriminability, 
if  BT and B are extracted from the same person, their corresponding cancelable ver-
sions BTC and BC must be similar. In this case, the fuzzy commitment is absolutely 
able to recover the same key, which the user provided in enrollment phase, from the 
cancelable biometric 𝐵𝐶  and the helper data HD retrieved from the database. We call 
the result of this process K’. The hash version of K’ is compared with hash(K) stored 
in the database. If they are matched, the user is authenticated; otherwise, the authenti-
cation process rejects the access of this user. In this scheme, only hash(K) and HD are 
stored. These two parameters cannot recover or invert to the cancelable biometric data 
or even the original biometric data. Therefore, we can affirm that this combination 
provides the non-invertible transform. The whole process of authentication phase is 
illustrated in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Authentication phase. 
4 Experimental Result 
In this proposal, we employ the set of facial images of many people to get the experi-
mental result. PCA is applied to extract feature vectors from user’s faces. Each feature 
vector has size of 200, and the value of each element is in range [0,1]. PCA is trained 
under the training data set containing 50 images of 10 South East Asians, 22 Middle 
and West Asians, and 18 Europeans. The testing data set includes 153 people; each 
has 20 different facial expression. The first image of each user is registered in the 
enrollment phase, and the others are used to be tested. The accuracy of the biometric 
authentication system is evaluated through these error rates: FAR, FRR, EER. The 
meanings of these rates are explained below: 
 FAR, also known as False Acceptance Rate, accepts an entrance when a visitor is 
invalid. This shows probability of the imposter logging in and succeeding.  
 FRR, also known as False Reject Rate, rejects an entrance when a visitor is valid. 
This shows probability of the visitor logging in & getting rejected 
 EER, also known as Equal Error Rate, is intersection of FAR & FRR, at which 
FAR equals FRR. 
In any biometric based authentication system, we need to decide the parameter called 
threshold. If match score is greater than this threshold, the person who sends the re-
quest will be authenticated, otherwise, the system will refuse the request. The value of 
threshold t is calculated by the formula  
𝑡𝑖 = 0.1 + 0.01×𝑖, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ ℕ, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∈ [0, 49] 
For each value of threshold, the values of FAR and FRR are calculated by statis-
tics. 
Fig. 5 shows the recognition accuracy results in term of FAR and FRR in cases of 
no biometric template protection, and Fig. 6 shows the result in cases of applying our 
hybrid scheme. 
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In the first case illustrated in Fig. 5, the FRR and FAR intersect at the threshold 
𝑡 ≈ 0.22. At this intersection, the error rate is about 9%. 
In the hybrid scheme, integrating random orthonormal projection and fuzzy com-
mitment, which is demonstrated in Fig. 6, the intersection of FRR and FAR (also 
known as EER) all values at 9%. This figure proves the proposed hybrid scheme de-
livers a positive result with the probability of correct recognition of around 91% (the 
threshold value also depends on the quantizing value; however, the result stays the 
same; in this experimental result, the quantizing value stands at 200). Hence, it is 
pertinent that the recognition performance of our hybrid scheme is competitive with 
the non-template protection ones. In summary, the combination of orthonormal matrix 
and fuzzy commitment in biometric-based authentication system is absolutely feasible 
and can be put into practice. 
 
Fig. 5. FAR and FRR with no template protection. 
 
Fig. 6. FAR and FRR with our hybrid scheme. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented an efficient and innovative hybrid biometric template 
protection scheme which takes benefits of random orthonormal projection and fuzzy 
commitment while preventing their limitations. The hybrid scheme satisfies all re-
quirements of: cancelability (revocability and diversity), security, and good perfor-
mance. By using the lightweight approach for generating orthonormal matrix instead 
of the traditional Gram-Schmidt in random orthonormal projection, the computational 
complexity is reduced significantly. The experimental result also demonstrates that 
the accuracy of recognition is around 91% which stays the same in comparison with 
the case of none security method applied. That makes the proposal feasible. 
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